Brown\u27s Shoe Fit Co., Tom Brown, Brown\u27s General Offices v. Jon Olch, Janet Olch, Henry Sigg, 330 Main Street Partners : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Brown's Shoe Fit Co., Tom Brown, Brown's General
Offices v. Jon Olch, Janet Olch, Henry Sigg, 330
Main Street Partners : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard D. Burbridge; Burbridge & Mitchell; Robert Felton; Attorneys for Appellees.
R. Paul Van Dam; Bruce Wycoff; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for Appellants.
R. Paul Van Dam (#3312) Bruce Wycoff (#4448) JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH 1500 First Interstate Plaza 170 South Main Street Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants
Richard D. Burbidge Stephen B. Mitchell BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 139 E. South Temple, Suite
2001 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Robert Felton 3 9 Exchange Place Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellees 7
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Brown\'s Shoe Fit Co v. Olch, No. 970199 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/782
« I'AH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS A|Q 
DOCKET Kin ^~7Q)QQ[-n&-
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa 
partnership; TOM BROWN; and, 
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an 
Iowa corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
JON OLCH; JANET OLCH; HENRY 
SIGG; and 33 0 MAIN STREET 
PARTNERS, 
Defendants/Appellees 
NO.970199-CA 
Priority 15 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, Presiding 
R. Paul Van Dam (#3312) 
Bruce Wycoff (#4448) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert Felton 
3 9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
7 1997 
3PEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa 
partnership; TOM BROWN; and, 
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an 
Iowa corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
JON OLCH; JANET OLCH; HENRY 
SIGG; and 330 MAIN STREET 
PARTNERS, 
Defendants/Appellees 
NO.970199-CA 
Priority 15 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, Presiding 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
13 9 E. South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Suite 2001 
84111 
R. Paul Van Dam (#3312) 
Bruce Wycoff (#4448) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Robert Felton 
3 9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ARGUMENT 
The June 11, 1996 Proceedings Were Not a 
Motion for Summary Judgment; The Trial Court 
Made Evidentiary Rulings on No Evidence; The 
Olches Misrepresent the Record 
B. The Jury, Not the Trial Court, Should Have 
Determined Brown's Fraud Claims 8 
C. The Basic Lease Is an Enforceable Contract; 
The Trial Court's Failure to Recognize that 
Fact Caused It to Commit Multiple Legal 
Errors 9 
1. The Basic Lease is a Contract 9 
.2. The Basic Lease Can and Should Be 
Specifically Performed 11 
3. The Olches Were Obligated to 
Negotiate (1) a Formal Lease; and 
(2) The Option-Period Rents in Good 
Faith 14 
D. Individual Plaintiff Brown's General Offices 
Has a Legally Cognizable Claim 20 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed the 
Olches' Counterclaim 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM 
D. December 12, 1996 Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Dismissing the Olches' 
Counterclaims) 
l 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Albiani v. United Artists Corp., 169 N.E. 435 (Mass. 1930) . 19 
Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass'n. of Portland, 381 P.2d 499 
(Or. 1963) 23 
American Towers Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 
930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) 21 
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) . . 14 
Barnes v. Campbell Chain Co., Inc., 267 S.E.2d 388 
(N.C. App. 1980) 21 
Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, Inc., 346 A.2d, 
419 (N.J. Super. 1975) 15 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Committee v. Thompson 
Michie Associates, 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986) 13 
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313 
(Ariz. 1988) 23 
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) 4 
Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 1994) 17 
Byrd Cos., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l. Bank, 
482 So.2d 247 (Ala. 1985) 12 
Candid Productions, Inc. v. International Skating Union, 
530 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 15, 16 
Cohn v. J.C. Pennev Co., Inc., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975) . . . 22 
Costin v. Malone, 402 So.2d 1257 (Fla. App. 1981) . . . . 21, 22 
Crismon v. Western Company of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 
(Utah App. 1987) 9 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991) 2 
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912) 14 
Putt v. Kremp, 894 P.2d 354 (Nev. 1995) 23 
Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144 (1946) 1 
Greenberg v. Wolf berg, 890 P.2d 895 (Okl. 1994) 23 
ii 
Howtek, Inc. v. Relisvs, 958 F. Supp. 46 (D.N.H. 1997) . . . 17 
In re Gulf Oil/Cities Servs. Tender Offer Litig., 
725 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 16 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1991) 24 
Keller v. Ray, Ouinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563 
(D. Utah 1995) aff'd., 78 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1996) . . . . . 22 
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984) 20 
Knight v. Cordrv, 913 P.2d 1206 (Ks. App. 1995) 23 
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P. 2d 602 (Utah 1974) 9 
Lewis v. James, 285 P.2d 86 (Cal. 1955) 18 
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 
319 U.A.R. 33, 36 (Utah App. 1997) 24 
Medesco, Inc. v. LNS Int'l., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 920 
(D. Utah 1991) 7 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1995) cert, denied, 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) 19 
Orpheus Vaudeville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co., 41 Utah 605, 
128 P. 575 (1912) 12 
Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) 17 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. , 123 L Ed 2d 611 (1993) . . . . 23 
R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1997) 10 
Reprosvstem B.V. v. SCM Corporation, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.) 
cert, denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984) 15, 16 
Sands v. Arruda, 270 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. 1971) 11, 12 
Sexton v. Servaas, 830 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind. 1993), 
dismissed on other grounds, 844 F. Supp. 471 (1994) 4 
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Oliker, 765 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1989) . . . . 23 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) 2 
Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church v. Howard Company 
Jewelers, 97 A.2d 144 (N.J. 1953) 14 
iii 
Wong v. DiGrazia, 386 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1963) 11 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 104-42-1 (1943) 1 
COURT RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) (2) 1, 2 
MISCELLANEOUS 
51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 196(4) (1968) 18 
L. Carroll, Alice Throucrh the Looking-Glass (1872) (quoted in 
United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499) (2d. Cir. 1991) 
(Pratt, J., dissenting) 5 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 139 7 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 674-76, § 674 23 
iv 
T ARGUMENT 
A. The June 11, 1996 Proceedings Were Not a Motion for Summary 
Judgment; The Trial Court Made Evidentiary Rulings on No 
Evidence; The Olches Misrepresent the Record, 
At the conclusion of the June 6, 1996 hearing the trial court 
gave no indication that the hearing to begin two hours before the 
June 11 trial would be anything in the nature of a summary judgment 
hearing: "The Court is persuaded that the issue of whether or not 
the question of specific performance is for the judge or jury to 
decide should be argued and ruled upon prior to trial. Resolution 
of this issue would have substantial bearing on the amount of time 
needed for trial." (R. 1143). 
The only summary judgment proceeding in this case occurred on 
December 11, 1995, before Judge Frank G. Noel. Judge Noel denied 
the Olches' motion, finding in his order1 that the parties had 
1
 At page 18 n.3 of their opposing brief, the Olches argue that 
Judge Noel's order was a legal nullity. To the contrary, it was a 
binding order that thereafter established the law of the case on 
all matters not specifically superseded by a later court order. 
Utah R. Civ. P.7(b)(2) provides, in part: 
Orders. An order includes every direction of the court 
including a minute order made and entered in writing and not 
included in a judgement. . . . 
Before the promulgation of Rule 7(b) (2) , its purpose was served by 
a statute, rather than a rule: 
Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in 
writing and not included in a judgment, is denominated an 
order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 104-42-1 (1943). 
In Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144, 149 (1946) 
the plaintiff argued that the court was powerless to hold her in 
contempt for failing to obey an oral order. In rejecting her 
contention, the Utah Supreme Court construed § 104-42-1: 
(continued...) 
1 
entered into a contract, that the contract had sufficient terms to 
be enforced, and that the parties intended to be bound by the terms 
of a lease. (R. 495, Add. B). Judge Pat B. Brian, Judge Noel's 
successor, never made any finding that the parties did not intend 
to be bound. Thus, Judge Noel's order does establish the law of 
the case below regarding intent. 
If the June 11 hearing had in fact been a summary judgment 
proceeding Brown's would have responded with appropriate counter-
affidavits and deposition testimony.2 Brown's did not do so 
1
 (...continued) 
[S]aid order was reduced by the clerk of the court as a 
minute entry. We hold that this is all that Section 104-
42-1 requires. We have an order of the court "entered in 
writing" by the clerk of the court . . . 
• * * 
Since we hold that the order in the form given by the 
court was a valid, lawful order it follows that the 
plaintiff's disobedience is a contempt of court . . . 
The trial court reduced its December 11, 1995 Order to writing. 
(R. 495, Add. B). Foreman and Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2) therefore 
establish that an oral order by a judge is in fact an "order" once 
reduced to a minute entry. Admittedly, Judge Noel's order was not 
a "final" order as defined in Utah R. App. P. 4(a) , but that is not 
the issue. 
2
 At pages 44-45 of their opposing brief, the Olches claim 
that Brown's has somehow waived its right to argue the June 11 
hearing was not a summary judgment hearing. Brown's is not 
arguing, however, that the trial court had no right to schedule the 
June 11 hearing. Brown's point is that the June 11 hearing the 
trial court scheduled was not a summary judgment hearing. The 
procedure the Olches and the trial court followed ambushed Brown's 
to the extent the hearing evolved — two hours before trial — into 
a summary judgment hearing. As a consequence, the decisions the 
Olches cite at page 46 of their opposing brief are largely 
irrelevant. Moreover, in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991), the Court held that the scheduling of a 
summary judgment hearing to be heard in less than 10 days "will 
void the grant unless the violation amounts to harmless error." 
Brown's shows below that the procedure the trial court followed was 
hardly harmless. In Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 
19 93) the Court overturned a summary judgment on issues that the 
(continued. . . ) 
2 
because there was no indication at any time prior to that hearing 
that the trial court would make any evidentiary rulings. This 
procedure effectively ambushed and sandbagged Brown's when the 
Olches made, and the trial court considered, evidentiary arguments 
at the hearing. 
The consequences of this procedure appear throughout the 
Olches' opposing brief. One example is illustrative of all: At 
page 43 the Olches argue that "there was not ever any contention in 
this case" of a certain factual issue. When, however, Brown's 
asked the trial court to make findings regarding Brown's 
contentions and proffers of what the trial evidence would have 
been, the Olches successfully argued to the trial court: 
Your honor makes findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and a ruling. Now Counsel wants to come in and say let's 
put in what our contentions are, and then let me speak 
for the defendants, and argue what their contentions 
might have been, had the case been tried and gone to a 
jury. That is wholly improper in findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. They are not to set forth the 
contentions. (R. 1533-34). 
In this case, the Olches' 
method of putting allegation before factual inquiry is 
reminiscent of the trial in Alice in Wonderland . . . 
Consider your verdict," the King said to the 
jury. 
"Not yet, not yet!" the Rabbit hastily 
interrupted. "There's a great deal to come 
before that!". . . . 
2
 (...continued) 
notice of hearing did not make "express reference to." The Olches 
argue at page 46 that the parties "had fully briefed all the legal 
issues." They do not contend, nor can they in good faith contend, 
however, that Brown's ever had any reason to believe, or warning, 
that they were required to file with the court before that hearing 
all of Brown's evidence on all those legal issues. 
3 
"Give your evidence, said the King: "and 
don't be nervous, or I'll have you executed on 
the spot.". . . . 
"No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first — 
verdict afterwards." 
Sexton v. Servaas, 830 F. Supp. 475, 480 n.5 (S.D. Ind. 1993), 
dismissed on other grounds, 844 F. Supp. 471 (1994). 
The trial court characterized the June 11 hearing in advance 
as merely a hearing on purely legal issues.3 Over its course it 
expanded from a hearing on the narrow issue of whether a judge or 
jury should decide overriding specific performance questions to a 
hearing on a motion to dismiss. The Olches' counsel never disputed 
until their brief Brown's counsel's characterization of the June 11 
hearing as involving a "motion to dismiss". (R. 1500, 1534) . This 
Court affirms a motion to dismiss "only where it clearly appears 
that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief 
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could 
prove to support their claim." See e.g., Brittain v. State, 882 
P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added). 
To justify their receiving a "sentence before the verdict", 
the Olches adopt the behavior of another Alice in Wonderland 
character: 
"When J use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean — 
neither more nor less." 
3
 At pages 46-47 of their opposing brief, the Olches contend 
that "Brown's obtained the dismissal of the claims asserted by 330 
Partners in its counterclaim." An examination of the record 
discloses, however, that the trial court dismissed that claim sua 
sponte, and as a matter of law. Brown's counsel"obtained" nothing. 
He merely gave two short responses totalling sixteen lines to 
questions that the trial court directly asked him. (R. 1323). 
4 
"The question is, " said Alice, "whether you can make 
words mean so many things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be 
master — that's all." 
L. Carroll, Alice Through the Looking-Glass (1872) (quoted in 
United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d. Cir. 1991) (Pratt, 
J., dissenting)). 
An examination of the record in this case makes clear that the 
Olches' claimed "undisputed" facts are not undisputed at all, and 
that Brown's could prove facts sufficient to support their claims. 
First, the Olches repeat ad nauseam their incantation that 
"Brown's would not have entered into a lease unless 330 Partners 
agreed to all of the more than thirty changes demanded by Brown's 
counsel in October, 1994." (Olches' Brief at 39-40; see also id. 
at 8, 11, 16, 44). In truth, Tom Brown repeatedly testified that 
Brown's was willing to negotiate those items. (R. 257, numbered 
page and unnumbered reverse page). 
Second, the Olches repeatedly assert that Brown's would not 
have entered into a lease unless it represented a "binding" 
agreement to lease for the two option periods. (Olches' Brief at 
10, 16, 48). Again, this statement palpably misrepresents Tom 
Brown's testimony. The Olches tried this same misrepresentation 
before the trial court by repeatedly asking it to expressly find 
that Brown's insisted on "enforceable" option periods. (R. 1360, 
1477-79; 1482) . The trial court refused to make any such finding. 
(R. 1482; 1485; 1422, Add. C). Because the trial court refused to 
find Brown's insisted on "enforceable" option periods, the Olches 
now assert, Humpty Dumpty-like, that Brown's insisted on "binding" 
5 
option periods. The two words are synonymous. The trial court 
"found"4 that Brown's insisted on neither. 
Third, the Olches assert that Brown's tried to get the Olches 
to agree on the option period lease rates before Brown's would sign 
a lease. (Olches' Brief at 9, 12, 13). To the contrary, the 
testimony at trial would have been that the Olches, not Brown's, 
insisted on establishing in advance the option period lease rates. 
(R. 1314, 1359, 1369) . 
In that regard, the Olches' counsel wrote Brown's counsel on 
September 22, 1994: " [T]he [Olches'] request for your client to 
come back to 330 Main Street Partners with a lease proposal, based 
on the $30 per square foot market rate, needs to be answered by the 
end of the day Monday, September 26th." 
Fourth, the Olches erroneously assert that "all of the 
negotiations between the parties for a lease were in writing." 
(Olches' Brief at 38, 44). Tom Brown's trial testimony would have 
been that during a September 14, 1994 telephone conversation with 
defendants Jon Olch and Henry Sigg, Olch and Sigg expressed their 
desire to establish the option period lease rates before the 
execution of the lease. On September 19, Tom Brown replied in 
writing that he could not "respond" to Olch's and Sigg's request to 
4
 Brown's counsel questioned the necessity or appropriateness 
of "findings" under the circumstances: "But findings in the 
context of a motion to dismiss are a real funny animal. These are 
not like findings anywhere else in jurisprudence, because there are 
no facts, except for anything that may have been stipulated to. 
The only thing in here that truly is a classic finding is finding 
14." (R. 1500). In any event, the trial court properly determined 
that Brown's never required "enforceable" or "binding" option 
periods. Brown's only expected the Olches to negotiate option 
period rents in good faith. See page 20, infra. 
6 
establish option-period rents as quickly as he had hoped. (R. 
887) . 
The evidence at trial would further have been that on 
September 22, 1994 the Olches' counsel5 wrote Brown's counsel 
confirming that the parties had conducted oral discussions "over 
the past four to six weeks." The Olches' counsel continued: "It 
is my understanding that, based on those discussions, the only 
remaining point to be settled between the parties is that of the 
rental rate." On September 30, Brown's counsel concurred that the 
parties had reached agreement on all terms except rent, and also 
noted that the Olches', not Brown's, had urgently insisted on 
establishing the option period rents then, rather than at the 
beginning of each option period. (R. 259) Brown's counsel made 
the appraisal suggestion that the Olches refer to at page 28 of 
their brief solely in the context of the Olches' urgent demand that 
Brown's propose within four days future option period renewal rates 
acceptable to the Olches. Tom Brown would have testified that he 
and the Olches ultimately agreed to establish the option period 
renewals at "fair market value". (R. 882, 883, 887, 1370). 
The truly undisputed facts before the trial court did not 
justify its dismissal of Brown's claims. Moreover, the legal 
posture of that hearing gave Brown's no advance notice that the 
trial court expected Brown's to put all their evidence in the 
5
 Because the Olches' (the parties to be charged) counsel 
wrote this letter, it is immune from the Olches' statute of frauds 
arguments. Moreover, the Olches' entire statute of frauds argument 
ignores the impact of Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 139. 
See generally Medesco, Inc. v. LNS Int'l., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 920, 
926-27 (D. Utah 1991) . Medesco and § 139 make clear that the 
Olches' statute of frauds argument is unavailing. (R. 1278). 
7 
record at a hearing two hours before trial. There was no factual 
basis for the trial court's dismissal of Brown's claims. Brown's 
shows in the following subpoints that the trial court also 
improperly applied the law to Brown's claims. 
B. The Jury, Not the Trial Court, Should Have Determined Brown's 
Fraud Claims. 
Curiously, the Olches nowhere in their opposing brief attempt 
to justify the trial court's Conclusion Nos. 4, 5 and 6. (R. 1424-
25, Add. C). 
In his August 5, 1994 letter (R. 882), defendant Jon Olch 
baldly admits that (1) he needed the Basic Leasee to obtain 
financing6; (2) he never intended to honor the Basic Lease; and (3) 
he and defendant Henry Sigg told Brown's that the Premises "would 
be ready for occupancy by the end of 1994." 
Brown's trial evidence would have been that the Olches were 
aware that upon their execution of the Basic Lease, Brown's 
immediately ordered approximately $170,000 worth of shoes for sale 
at the Premises during the Winter 1994-95 season. (R. 262, 301, 
492, 1302-05, 1371-72). The Olches knew that Brown's made that 
major financial commitment, and had retained an interior designer, 
in reliance on an agreement the Olches at that time had no 
intention of honoring. In fact, defendant Sigg encouraged Brown to 
ship those shoes for storage to a shed Sigg owned. (R. 13 03, 
1372). In response to all this evidence of their duplicity, the 
Olches respond with a single legal argument: Brown's suffered no 
damages. (Olches' Brief at 48). In addition to benefit-of-the-
6
 On October 8, 1993 Brown's gave the Olches a letter (R. 
991) necessary for them to obtain financing. (R. 262) . The Olches 
never explain why they needed a second letter to obtain financing. 
8 
bargain damages, a plaintiff may also recover reliance damages 
occasioned by fraudulent conduct. See, e.g., Lamb v. Bangart, 525 
P. 2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974) . Whatever a jury may ultimately 
determine Brown's lost profits to be, Brown's unquestionably 
suffered reliance damages. 
The Olches themselves cannot explain or justify the trial 
court's refusal to let the jury decide if Brown's suffered damages 
— out-of-pocket or lost profits — in reasonable reliance on the 
Olches' false representation that they intended to honor the Basic 
Lease. In fact, the trial court's insensitivity to the Olches' 
conduct in a fraud context prejudicially permeated its view of 
other legal issues. 
C The Basic Lease Is an Enforceable Contract; The Trial Court's 
Failure to Recognize that Fact Caused It to Commit Multiple 
Legal Errors. 
1. The Basic Lease is a Contract. 
In their Brief, the Olches make repeated references to the 
testimony of one of Brown's experts, Richard G. Robins ("Robins"). 
The Olches conveniently omit Robins' conclusion, based on his years 
of experience as a leasing agent of commercial retail property that 
in the Basic Lease the parties came to an economic agreement on the 
basis for a lease. (R. 958). All necessary parties signed the 
Basic Lease. They recited that the terms contained therein were 
"agreed upon". Thus, the Basic Lease was not an "agreement to 
agree". It was an agreement. It was a contract. 
These inescapable facts distinguish this case from Crismon v. 
Western Company of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987) . 
There, the trial court specifically found, after trial, that 
various letters the parties exchanged constituted a mutual 
9 
rejection of each other's attempts to form an agreement. Relying 
on the basic contract law principle that a contract is not formed 
without a meeting of the minds, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's evidentiary finding. Crismon accordingly establishes 
nothing in this case, because the Basic Lease explicitly recites 
that each and every term and condition contained therein had been 
"agreed upon by and between" Brown's and the Olches. 
The Basic Lease therefore memorializes the terms obligating 
the Olches to lease the Premises when completed to Brown's on the 
terms recited in the Basic Lease. Independent of any testimony by 
Rich Robins or anyone else, Judge Noel found as a matter of law7 
that the parties intended to be bound by its terms. Judge Brian 
made no contrary finding. 
Accordingly, as Brown's show at pp. 1-2, supra, the law of the 
case below is that the Basic Lease is a contract binding the 
parties to its terms. Indeed, the very purpose of the Basic Lease 
was to bind Brown's and the Olches to its economic terms. Brown's 
showed at p. 13 of their initial brief that the Basic Lease 
contained all the essential terms of the parties' agreement and 
that the mere fact that part of the performance is that the parties 
will enter into a contract in the future does not render the 
original agreement any less binding. The Olches contend that the 
resulting lease would necessarily be some complicated, hyper-
technical document. To the contrary, Brown's leasing expert, 
7
 Utah law is "well settled" that "when a contract is in 
writing and the language is unambiguous, the intention of the 
parties must be determined from the words of the agreement . . . " 
See, e.g., R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068, 
1074 n.5 (Utah 1997). 
10 
Robins, would have testified that frequently in commercial leasing 
situations, the parties use a "boiler plate" lease. (R. 959). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court explained why the Basic Lease 
is a binding contract: 
The parties agreed in writing . . . to execute a 
lease in the future, and there is nothing in what they 
signed which permits an inference that it would have no 
effect until they signed the ultimate lease . . . From 
the moment the parties signed that document they were 
contractually bound to execute a lease in accordance with 
its terms, . . . No contract otherwise binding is to be 
treated as a nullity solely because it is a contract to 
execute still another document or instrument in the 
future. Every agreement for the purchase or sale of real 
estate contemplates the future execution of a deed and 
perhaps mortgages and other instruments, but such 
agreements are not by reason thereof alone unenforceable. 
Sands v. Arruda, 270 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Mass. 1971). 
Courts do not easily destroy such contractual rights: 
"Where the matters left for future agreement are 
unessential, each party will be forced to accept a 
reasonable determination of the unsettled point." . . . 
" [t]he law does not favor, but leans against, the 
destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it 
will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry 
into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if 
that can be ascertained." 
Wong v. DiGrazia, 386 P.2d 817, 827 (Cal. 1963) (citations 
omitted). 
2 . The Basic Lease Can and Should Be Specifically Performed. 
The trial court's failure to appreciate that the Basic 
Lease was a binding contract signed by all necessary parties led it 
to commit multiple legal errors. With respect to Brown's specific 
performance claim, the trial court failed to realize that the 
initial three-year term of the Basic Lease was the dog, and the two 
option periods were the tail. As a result, both the trial court 
and the Olches have the tail wagging the dog. 
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With respect to the initial three-year period the Olches argue 
only that the Basic Lease is not specifically enforceable because 
it lacks a commencement date. The Olches cite no authority for 
this naked assertion. In fact, the law is to the contrary: "The 
failure to specify a definite commencement date is not fatal to the 
creation of a term for years." Byrd Cos., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust 
Nat'l. Bank, 482 So.2d 247, 252 (Ala. 1985); cf. , Orpheus 
Vaudeville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co.. 41 Utah 605, 128 P. 575, 578 
(1912) (when a landlord is building, altering or repairing a 
building "the lessee usually is to take possession of the building 
or premises when completed, altered, or repaired, and the agreement 
often also contains a lease.") "Usual" covenants and provisions 
are incorporated into leases unless the parties manifest a contrary 
intent. See Wyuta Cattle Co. v. Connell, 299 P. 279, 282 (Wyo. 
1931). Thus, the absence of an express commencement date is not 
fatal to Brown's specific performance claim. 
The Olches make only one other argument regarding the 
unavailability of specific performance. They argue the rent for 
the two option periods is too indefinite for specific performance. 
The indefiniteness of option period rents is, however, no bar to 
the specific performance of an initial period that is subject to 
clear and definite rental rates. See e.g.. Sands v. Arruda, 270 
N.E.2d 826, 829 (Mass. 1971) . The Olches identify no legal 
authority holding that the initial 3-year term of the Basic Lease 
12 
is unenforceable and void ab initio merely because the two option 
periods may be.8 
In its Red Queen-like rush to order Brown's execution before 
hearing the evidence necessary to render a proper verdict on 
Brown's specific performance claims, the trial court ignored the 
analysis appropriate in all Utah specific performance actions: 
It may be perfectly proper for counsel to invoke 
every technical rule, whether applicable or not, to 
absolve his client from the contractual obligations 
assumed by the latter. It is not the duty of a court, 
however, to yield to the counsel's contentions in that 
regard, and to make a strained effort to find some flaw 
in a contract whereby a party may escape liability from 
performing a plain and unequivocal obligation which he 
voluntarily assumed, and for doing so has received and 
retains an adequate consideration. 
"When land, or any estate therein, is the subject-
matter of the agreement, the inadequacy of the legal 
remedy is well settled, and the equitable jurisdiction is 
firmly established. Whenever a contract concerning real 
property is in its nature and incidents entirely 
unobjectionable—when it possesses none of those features 
which, in ordinary language, influence the discretion of 
the court—it is as much a matter of course for a court of 
equity to decree its specific performance as it is for a 
court of law to give damages for its breach." Where 
therefore, a contract is clearly established in which one 
of the parties bound himself to sell, or did sell, 
specific real property, a prima facie right to have such 
a contract specifically performed arises. If nothing is 
made to appear which could influence or invoke the 
8
 The Olches do nothing to explain or justify the trial 
court's dismissal of Brown's specific performance claims because of 
non-joinder of the Tenants. Bonneville Tower Condominium 
Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, 728 P.2d 1017 
(Utah 1986) unequivocally holds that a trial court commits 
reversible error by dismissing a specific performance claim with 
prejudice because a plaintiff fails to join an indispensable party. 
The Olches' claim Bonneville Towers does not apply because there 
the dismissal occurred "at the outset" of the proceeding. (Olches' 
Brief at 34) . The Olches do not explain, however, why the 
prejudice is greater at the outset than it is when defendants such 
as the Olches sandbag plaintiffs by waiting until 6 days before 
trial to raise the issue, as happened here. 
13 
discretion of a court of equity to justify is refusal to 
decree specific performance, a decree requiring the party 
to perform must follow, as a matter of course, as stated 
by Mr. Pomeroy. (citation omitted). 
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 623-24 (1912) . 
Brown's is entitled to a decree of specific performance at 
least for the first three years the parties agreed to in the Basic 
Lease. Moreover, Brown's are entitled to a decree that the Olches 
are obligated to negotiate the terms of both the lease and the 
option period rents9 in good faith. 
3. The Olches Were Obligated to Negotiate (1) a Formal 
Lease; and (2) The Option-Period Rents in Good Faith. 
Inexplicably, the trial court utterly failed to consider the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the "Covenant") in its 
Findings and Conclusions. (R. 1417-27, Add. C). The trial court 
simply ignored and dismissed those claims. 
The Olches' citation to Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 
921 (Utah 1993) confirms that the Covenant governed the parties' 
conduct in connection with the Basic Lease. Andreini makes clear 
the Covenant governs the parties' conduct whenever there is "some 
type of preexisting contractual relationship." Brown's has shown 
at pages 9-10, supra, that the Basic Lease is a contract. 
As a result, the authorities the Olches cite at pages 34-35 of 
their brief are irrelevant to this Court's analysis because none of 
the litigating parties had ever entered into a contract. For 
example, the Olches offer at page 35 an extended quotation from 
Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church v. Howard Company 
9
 Brown's showed at pages 33 & n.9 of its initial brief, and 
at page 20, infra, that the trial evidence would have established 
that the parties' agreement regarding the option period rent was 
specifically enforceable. 
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Jewelers, 97 A.2d 144 (N.J. 1953). A later New Jersey opinion 
makes clear, however, that the Howard parties never reached a 
meeting of the minds on essential contract terms. See Berg Agency 
v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, Inc., 346 A.2d, 419, 423 (N.J. Super. 
1975) . The Berg court distinguished Howard from another situation 
where "both parties signed the same document so that there can be 
no question of the meeting of their minds on the provisions in that 
document." Id. at 423. Both the Olches and Brown's signed the 
Basic Lease. They became contractually bound to its terms, 
including the negotiation of a formal lease containing its terms. 
Candid Productions, Inc. v. International Skating Union, 53 0 
F. Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), another decision the Olches rely on, 
reflects the same situation. There, the prior contract had 
expired, and Candid argued the defendant was required to negotiate 
a new contract in good faith. That is not the case here. Brown's 
and the Olches already had a contract that expressly required the 
parties to incorporate its provisions into a lease. The Candid 
court expressly observed that the law requires the Olches to 
negotiate the lease terms in good faith: "Where the parties are 
under a duty to perform that is definite and certain the courts 
will enforce a duty of good faith, including good faith 
negotiation, in order that a party not escape from the obligation 
he has contracted to perform." Id. at 1335 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Reprosystem B.V. v. SCM Corporation, 727 F.2d 
257 (2d Cir.) cert, denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984), the parties never 
jointly executed any agreement such as the Basic Lease that recited 
their agreement to all essential contractual terms. Instead, the 
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parties exchanged unsigned, see id. at 260, drafts that contained 
"provisions that conditioned their binding effect on formal 
execution and delivery." Jd. at 262. The court therefore found 
there was no duty to negotiate an initial contract in good faith. 
See id. at 264. At the same time, however, the court recognized 
that in other situations, the parties "may be bound to negotiate in 
good faith to reach an agreement." JEd. at 264. 
One court, analyzing the holdings of both Candid and 
Reprosvstem, concluded that those decisions did not require good-
faith negotiations because the parties had never reached a binding 
underlying contract in either case: 
However, those cases deal with the so-called 
"agreement to agree," which is less an agreement than a 
stage of negotiations and which courts refuse to 
recognize as imposing limitations and obligations—i.e., 
which courts often refuse to recognize as a contract. 
See Candid Prods. , 530 F. Supp. at 1334-35. We deal here 
with a fully enforceable contract with complete 
provisions on all essential subjects. To the extent that 
defendants are arguing that courts cannot second-guess 
negotiating tactics, they are incorrect. Courts are 
often called upon to determine whether a party negotiated 
in good faith. For example, courts must determine 
whether an insurance company failed to settle a personal 
injury lawsuit in good faith and instead subjected its 
insured to liability above his coverage. 
In re Gulf Oil/Cities Servs. Tender Offer Litiq., 725 F. Supp. 712, 
739 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) . 
Likewise, a case the Reprosystem court referred to in its 
analysis explicitly confirms a duty to negotiate in good faith 
where, as here, there is an initial contract, such as the Basic 
Lease, that anticipates the execution of a formal agreement: 
There is, however, the argument that at the very 
least the agreement of May 8th carried with it the 
obligation to negotiate the terms of a definitive 
agreement in good faith and to execute the contract on 
the terms that had been agreed upon. For this argument, 
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plaintiff relies on Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial 
Industries, Inc., 248, A.2d 625 (Del. 1968). Assuming 
that there was a binding agreement on May 8th, we would 
agree that an obligation to negotiate in good faith a 
definitive agreement was implied but, as Itek held, 
absent such good faith, plaintiff could sue for a breach 
of contract. 
Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) . 
More recently, one Federal District Court canvassed law 
reviews, treatises and judicial decisions from throughout the 
country before concluding that agreements to negotiate in good 
faith are not unenforceable as a matter of law. See Howtek, Inc. 
v. Relisys, 958 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D.N.H. 1997). In describing the 
required process, the Relisvs court described the factual inquiry 
appropriate to determine whether good faith negotiations occurred: 
The question is whether it is to be inferred from the 
totality of the employer's conduct that he went through 
the motions of negotiations as an elaborate pretense with 
no sincere desire to reach an agreement if possible, or 
that it bargained in good faith, but was unable to arrive 
at an acceptable agreement with the union. 
Id. at 49 (citation omitted). 
The Olches argue at page 3 6 of their opposing brief that Utah 
juries are incapable of making such a determination. The Olches 
never explain why, however. Brown v. Weis, 871 P. 2d 552, 564 n.18 
& 565 (Utah App. 1994) establishes that juries exist for the 
express purpose of making such determinations. Weis also makes 
clear that a trial court errs in deciding such issues in connection 
with a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
Brown's and the Olches specifically "agreed upon" the Basic 
Lease provisions, and agreed they would "incorporate" those 
provisions into a final lease to be executed by the parties. 
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Defendant Jon Olch admitted his duty to negotiate a formal lease. 
(R. 462). The Olches now seek to create the erroneous impression 
that the parties have already done their best to negotiate a lease, 
but have failed.10 (Olches' Brief at 38-39). 
In their initial brief at pages 9 and 50, Brown's showed that 
the two leases the Olches submitted materially changed the terms 
they had already agreed to in the Basic Lease. The Olches do not 
dispute they sought to change those terms. Because of the Olches' 
unilateral changes to the parties' binding agreement, Brown's was 
under no obligation to assent to, negotiate, or even consider, the 
Olches' proposed leases: 
[T]he parties to a contract to lease have the right to 
demand that the lease to be executed shall comply with 
the terms of the agreement, and a proffered lease which 
does not conform to the agreement need not be accepted or 
executed. 
51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 196(4) (1968) . In fact, the Olches' 
proposal of leases that changed the provisions of the Basic Lease 
constituted a refusal to perform on the Olches' part. See Lewis v. 
James, 285 P.2d 86, 89-90 (Cal. 1955). Similarly, " [a] n agreement 
10
 At pages 10-11, 17 and 38 of their opposing brief, the 
Olches assert that they and Brown's did negotiate, but could not 
agree on "many" or "a number" of points, and that such failure 
indicated nothing more than "normal disagreements between a 
landlord and tenant." This facially reasonable statement ignores 
the facts that (1) the Olches insisted on provisions that 
materially changed the Basic Lease; and (2) "many" or "a number" of 
the disagreements resulted from commercially unreasonable and 
sometimes outrageous terms the Olches demanded. Brown's expert, 
Robins, testified in his deposition that in all his years of retail 
leasing experience he had "never seen" certain provisions before. 
(R. 980-81). If the trial court had permitted a trial, Brown's 
would have introduced evidence establishing the Olches' repeated 
insistence on terms designed to make their proposed leases 
unsignable. The situation the Olches created in the process was 
far from "normal disagreements between a landlord and tenants." 
The Olches were determined to "break" a contract the>y no longer 
needed once they obtained their financing. 
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to execute a lease is not broken by the refusal to sign a lease 
which imposes terms not provided for or contemplated in the 
agreement." Albiani v. United Artists Corp., 169 N.E. 435, 437 
(Mass. 1930). 
In Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Centers, Inc. , 889 P.2d 445, 456 (UtahApp. 1995) cert, denied, 899 
P. 2d 1231 (Utah 1995) this Court held that both landlords and 
tenants cannot exercise any discretion in a lease relationship 
capriciously or in bad faith. The Olches argue they have 
discretion regarding the ancillary terms of the lease the Basic 
Lease required the parties to negotiate. It necessarily follows 
that the Olches are bound to conduct those negotiations for those 
terms in good faith. 
The Olches never truly engaged in negotiations, good-faith or 
otherwise. Instead, they twice demanded that Brown's accept terms 
directly contrary to terms the Olches had agreed to in the Basic 
Lease. In connection with its remand, this Court should either (1) 
order the Olches to specifically perform their obligation to engage 
in good-faith negotiations of a lease consistent with the Basic 
Lease; (2) instruct the trial court to permit the jury (a) to 
determine the usual non-economic terms of commercial retail leases, 
and (b) declare those terms to be the non-economic portions of the 
lease contemplated by the Basic Lease; (3) instruct the trial court 
that the Olches' failure to negotiate in good faith renders them 
liable as a matter of law for Brown's damages; or (4) instruct the 
trial court that the jury should determine whether the Olches' past 
conduct violated the Covenant. 
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Finally, the Olches do not address at all Brown's argument, at 
page 31 n.8 of their initial brief, that the Olches were also 
obligated to negotiate in good faith the rents for the option 
periods. At page 33 of their initial brief, Brown's identifies 
numerous courts that have specifically enforced agreements to set 
future lease rates at the fair market value existing at the time of 
renewal. Indeed, counsel for Brown's is aware of no reported 
decision holding that such a standard is too indefinite for 
enforcement. The Olches have not identified any such decision. 
Tom Brown would have testified that the parties agreed the option 
period rents would be the then-existing fair market value of the 
Premises. Accordingly, on remand, this Court should also instruct 
the trial court that if the jury finds the parties made such an 
agreement, the Olches are under the additional duty to negotiate 
these renewal rates in good faith, and that, if the parties are 
unable to agree on fair market value, the trial court is required 
to do so. 
D. Individual Plaintiff Brown's General Offices Has a Legally 
Cognizable Claim 
Brown's does not challenge the trial court's Finding No. 15 
(R. 1422, Add. C) . They do contend that Conclusion No. 9 (R. 1425, 
Add. C) in no way necessarily results from that finding. 
In Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984) the Utah 
Supreme Court expressly recognized that an individual partner has 
standing to sue a party who contracts with the partnership if the 
individual partner "suffered direct injury personally." 
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The analytical basis for this rule is the fact that all 
partners of a partnership are ultimately in privity of contract 
with entities that contract with the partnership: 
It is fundamental that all partners are agents of 
each other, that a contract entered into by the 
agent is a contract entered into by the principal 
and that all partners are liable on any contract 
executed by a single partner in the name of the 
partnership. If a partner may be sued for 
nonpayment or other breach of the contract, he 
certainly is privy to the contract. 
Barnes v. Campbell Chain Co., Inc., 267 S.E.2d 388, 389 (N.C. App. 
1980). 
A plaintiff must either be (1) in privity with the 
defendant; or (2) a third-party beneficiary, in order to maintain 
an action for breach of contract. See, e.g., American Towers 
Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Utah 
1996) . Because Brown's General Offices was in privity of contract 
with the Olches, it has standing to sue for its foreseeable 
particularized damages. Privity renders superfluous the third-
party beneficiary analysis the Olches suggest.11 Accordingly, this 
11
 Because the trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of 
law that Brown's General Offices could not sue for its 
particularized economic losses, it never permitted the jury to 
consider the foreseeability and amount of Brown's General Offices' 
individual damages. 
In a related vein, the Olches suggest the trial court 
properly dismissed Brown's General Offices' claims because it had 
not properly pled them as special damages. Even if the special 
damages rule applies to this claim, trial courts err as a matter of 
law in dismissing special damages claims for failure to plead with 
specificity. See Costin v. Malone, 402 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. App. 
1981) . Additionally, such dismissal impermissibly shifts the 
burden of proof: 
Moreover, the appellees did not meet their burden 
essential to obtain a summary judgment. The moving 
party must prove the non-existence of a material 
(continued...) 
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court should reverse the trial court's Conclusion No. 9 (R.1425, 
Add. C) and order a trial of Brown's General Offices' separate and 
distinct damage12 claims. 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed the Olches' Counterclaim 
The Olches' counterclaim was not, as they contend, for 
"abuse of process". An abuse of process claim relates only to 
events that occur after a lawsuit has been filed. See Keller v. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 & n.15 (D. Utah 
1995) aff'd. , 78 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1996). On the other hand, 
" [a]n action challenging the initiation of a lawsuit is an action 
for malicious prosecution or for wrongful bringing of civil 
proceedings, and not for abuse of process." Jd. The Olches' 
counterclaim challenges Brown's initiation of this action. 
Accordingly, their claim is for malicious prosecution or wrongful 
bringing of civil prosecution. 
11
 ( . . . continued) 
fact in issue. Here the appellees did not 
demonstrate that the appellants sustained no special 
damages. The appellees cannot shift this burden by 
pointing to the record and arguing that the 
appellants had neither alleged nor proven special 
damages. 
Id. 
12
 At page 40 of their brief the Olches gratuitously claim 
that they first learned of Brown's General Offices' damage claims 
"shortly before trial." In fact, by January 23, 1996 - 140 days 
before trial, and before the trial court even set the trial date 
(R. 573) — the Olches knew not only the existence, but also the 
exact amount ($293,525), of Brown's General Offices' claimed 
damages. (R. 541-542) . Utah has no inflexible rule regarding the 
pleading of special damages. The only concern is whether a 
defendant has notice of a plaintiff's claimed damages. See Cohn v. 
J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975). The Olches 
had ample notice. 
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To prevail on their claim, the Olches must satisfy the 
requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 674-76.13 In its 
Finding Nos. 1-8 supporting the dismissal of the Olches' 
counterclaim (R. 1408, Add. D to this Brief), the trial court made 
findings on each element of the Olches' counterclaim. 
Numerous judicial decisions 14 hold that whether a plaintiff 
had probable cause under §§ 674 and 675 is a question of law, not 
13
 § 674. General Principle 
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation 
or procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to 
liability to the other for wrongful civil proceedings if 
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a 
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the 
claim in which the proceedings are based, and 
(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have 
terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought. 
§ 675. Existence of Probable Cause 
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation 
or procurement of civil proceedings against another has probable 
cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the existence of 
the facts upon which the claim is based, and either 
(a) correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts 
the claim may be valid under the applicable law, or 
(b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of 
counsel, sought in good faith and given after full disclosure of 
all relevant facts within his knowledge and information. 
§ 676. Propriety of Purpose 
To subject a person to liability for wrongful civil 
proceedings, the proceedings must have been initiated or continued 
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper 
adjudication of the claim on which they are based. 
14
 See, e.g.. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. , 123 L Ed 2d 611, 
625 n.7, 626 (1993); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
758 P.2d 1313, 1321 (Ariz. 1988); Knight v. Cordrv, 913 P.2d 1206, 
1209 (Ks. App. 1995); Putt v. Kremp, 894 P.2d 354, 357 (Nev. 1995); 
Greenbercr v. Wolf berg, 890 P.2d 895, 903 n.29 (Okl. 1994); Alvarez 
v. Retail Credit Ass'n. of Portland, 381 P.2d 499, 502 (Or. 1963); 
cf., Sheldon Appel Co. v. Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 504 (Cal. 1989) 
("To avoid improperly deterring individuals from resorting to the 
courts for resolution of disputes, the common law affords litigants 
the assurance that tort liability will not be imposed for filing a 
lawsuit unless a court subsequently determines that the institution 
of the lawsuit was without probable cause." (Emphasis in 
original)). 
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of fact. Similarly, a determination of whether a legal position 
was "without merit" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is a 
question of law, not of fact. See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 
203 (Utah App. 1991) . Relying on Judge Noel's initial finding in 
Brown's favor15 (R. 495, Add. B), and its own view of the merits 
of Brown's filing of their complaint, the trial court expressly 
found that, as a matter of law, Brown's legal positions did not 
exhibit a lack of probable cause or a purpose other than securing 
a proper adjudication of Brown's claims. Because the Olches fail 
to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's detailed 
findings, this Court assumes the record supports those findings. 
See, e.a., Macris & Assocs.t Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 319 
U.A.R. 33, 36 (Utah App. 1997). 
The trial court thus correctly dismissed the Olches' 
counterclaim. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the 
trial court's dismissal of Brown's claims. It should affirm the 
trial court's dismissal of the Olches' counterclaim. 
DATED September /7 1997. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
BV SWAL uJtj$£ 
R. Paul Van Df^|L^O 
Bruce Wycoff NJT-^--^ 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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 In its ruling the trial court explained part of its thought 
process: "There is, in the Court's opinion, evidenced by the 
ruling of Judge Noel, a basis for reasonable people to differ on 
whether an enforceable agreement existed between plaintiff and 
defendant." (R. 1324) 
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180170.1 14i»< 
A hearing was held in this matter on June 11, 1996 at the hour of 8:30 a.m., at the 
commencement of trial, for the purpose of addressing certain legal issues in the matter. 
Plaintiffs appeared in person and by and through their counsel of record, Paul Van Dam and 
Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. Defendants Jon and Janet Olch 
appeared in person and by and through their counsel of record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge 
& Mitchell. Defendants 330 Main Street Partners and Henry Sigg appeared in person and by 
their counsel of record Robert Felton. 
The court, at an earlier hearing held June 6, 1996, had requested that both parties file 
memoranda respecting the legal issues that they believed should be determined by the court prior 
to and/or during the trial. Both parties filed written memoranda as requested by the court. 
The court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties and having heard 
extensive oral arguments and the responses by counsel to specific inquiries by the court 
concerning undisputed facts and the respective positions of the parties, and the court being fully 
apprised in the matter, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court determines that there is no material dispute regarding the following facts: 
1. Plaintiffs, Brown's Shoe Fit Co., Brown's General Offices, and Tom Brown took 
an active part in the initiation of civil proceedings against defendants in this matter. 
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2. At a December 11, 1995 hearing Judge Frank G. Noel ordered that the March 18, 
1994 Basic Lease Provisions constituted an enforceable contract between the parties, and that the 
parties intended to be bound by its terms. 
3. The plaintiffs did not act in bad faith or without a factual basis in filing their 
Complaint herein. 
4. There was a basis for reasonable people to differ on whether an enforceable 
agreement existed between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
5. Plaintiffs acted in good faith in asserting their claims against defendants. Plaintiffs 
did not act unreasonably or in any way approach this lawsuit for totally wrong reasons. 
6. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint primarily for the purpose of securing the proper 
adjudication of their claims stated in the Complaint. 
7. Plaintiffs' belief in the facts on which their Complaint was based was reasonable. 
8. Plaintiffs' belief that under those facts their claims might be valid under applicable 
law was reasonable. 
9. Some time after filing their Complaint, plaintiffs caused a lis pendens to be 
recorded against the property which was the subject matter of this action. 
10. The plaintiffs did not act in bad faith or without probable cause in recording that 
lis pendens. 
11. Plaintiffs did not record the lis pendens for an ulterior purpose for which it was 
not intended. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A person is liable for the wrongful use of civil proceedings only when that person 
acts without probable cause, for the purpose of harassment or annoyance and with malice. In 
other words, to be actionable, such an action must be brought primarily for a purpose other than 
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claims on which the proceedings are based. 
2. Plaintiffs are not liable to defendants for wrongful use of civil proceedings. 
3. A person is liable for abuse of process if, even though an action may have been 
properly initiated, and even though the process was lawfully issued, if the process was used for 
an ulterior purpose for which it was not intended. 
4r The filing of a lis pendens is absolutely privileged. 
5. Plaintiffs are not liable to defendants for abuse of process. 
6. None of defendants' counterclaims against plaintiffs has merit. 
7. Defendants' counterclaims that were, or could have been, brought in this action 
should be dismissed with prejudice qml q % ^ merits. 
DATED this day of yWgttSf 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ 
Honorable Pat a. Brian 
Third District Court Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
BURDIGE & MITCHELL 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Attorneys for Defendants Jon Olch 
and Janet Olch 
Robert Felton 
Attorneys for Defendants 330 Main 
Street Partners and Henry Sigg 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Paul Van Dam 
Bruce Wycoff 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
On this fj$r day of A«gnsT, 1996, pursuant to Rule 77(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and following entry thereof, I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, via first class 
United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Bruce Wycoff 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert Felton 
39 Exchange Place, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
f)c hKl It. \JtoLAlt-
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